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UNDERSTANDING VOICE: WRITING IN A
JUDICIAL CONTEXT
Andrea McArdle

I. INTRODUCTION
When we read a judicial opinion, does it “sound” in a distinctive and recognizable way? To put it differently, does a judicial
opinion have a “voice,” and if so, what are its attributes? Is voice
defined by the opinion’s genre (that is, the writing), the writer, or
both? What is the relationship between voice and rhetoric? Is
there an independent value in using voice, as distinguished from
a consideration of rhetoric, as an analytic or interpretive tool? If
so, how does attention to the concept of voice add to a reader’s
interpretive resources?
In this Article, I address these questions by discussing and
modeling an approach for understanding judicial voice. I begin in
part II by examining various conceptualizations of voice in
literary writing and suggest how voice, when embraced as a
central metaphor in written discourse, is a complex, multifaceted
concept. I then consider how various understandings of voice have
been imported into the analysis of legal writing. From there, I
introduce judicial voice, and identify two complementary
dimensions: One (genre-based) is tied to the recurring features of
appellate opinions and other writings (advocacy briefs and bench
memoranda) that stand in textual relation to these opinions; the
other (authorial) is linked to an opinion author’s signature rhetorical choices and expressive style. I suggest that we should avoid
thinking of judicial opinion voice as either simply genre-based or
authorial but instead adopt a “both/and” formulation, which
locates judicial opinion voice in both the writing and the writer.
In part III, I develop an analytic framework that includes
both of these dimensions of voice. To structure this part, I begin
with three textually related judicial writing contexts: the bench
. © 2015, Andrea McArdle. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, CUNY School of
Law.
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memo, the advocacy brief, and the judicial opinion. For each of
these writing contexts, I address those aspects of voice that are
tied to the writing itself—that is, genre-based voice. In addition
to this genre-structured discussion, in this part, I consider its
complement, authorial voice. I examine when it finds expression
in the bench memo and advocacy brief, and then suggest ways in
which to identify authorial voice in the judicial opinion. Here I
argue that, in any judicial opinion, authorial voice is never singular but comprises multiple voices, including, potentially, those of
other judges, judicial clerks, and advocates.
I apply the framework in part IV to illuminate an opinion’s
doctrinal reasoning, and illustrate with close analysis of three
Supreme Court opinions. Here I show that there is good reason
for writers and readers of judicial writing to develop a sensibility
about judicial opinion voice. I argue that using genre-based and
authorial voice as an analytic resource can aid understanding of a
writing’s overall cogency, or lack thereof. First, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 attending to
the judicial voice helps illuminate the development of a jointly
authored main opinion including the challenges of writing by
“committee.” Analyzing judicial voice in two other Supreme Court
opinions draws attention to interpretive problems and tensions in
legal doctrine, including gaps and contradictions in reasoning or
tendencies in an opinion to strain doctrine to fit the facts.2
I conclude that becoming attuned to how an opinion is voiced,
and resonates, is an independently important analytic tool:
Because it operates aurally and allows us to make our way past
surface rhetoric, the dimension of voice can aid our understanding
of a judicial writing’s deeper structures of meaning.
II. VOICE: OF TEXTS AND AUTHORS
In the literature of writing about writing, the idea of a
writer’s voice has long occupied commentators.3 In line with some
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. See infra sec. IV(A)–(B).
3. For some, the pressing question is whether voice, if understood as an expression of
an individual author, is an appropriate focus of inquiry at all. Theorists from New Critics
to post-structuralists have disputed the importance of the author; instead, these schools of
thought argue that the written text, not the author, is the source of meaning and touchstone for interpretation. Peter Elbow, Introduction, in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON VOICE AND
WRITING xiii, xviii (Peter Elbow ed., 1994).
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theorists’ de-emphasis of the author is a social constructionist
view that written discourse is the product of one’s culture and
social (including professional) community, which subsumes many
individual voices.4 Further, despite the familiarity of voice in the
context of spoken speech, identifying attributes of a writer’s voice
is a complex undertaking; depending on the theorist, it can embrace expression that is truly personal in the sense of writing that
is indistinguishable from the person who is writing,5 or writing by
a persona, in the sense of a role or disguise that a writer adopts
and adapts to the purpose for which, and the audiences to whom,
she writes.6
For example, some thoughtful commentary links written
voice with a recognizable style, or signature,7 or with a tone that
is the product of a series of linguistic gestures that result in a
“carefully constructed artifact.”8 This view is more consistent with
the idea of voice as persona. However, some writers suggest that
voice is not a consciously cultivated expressive style but rather an
attribute that a writer locates, or recovers, from within.9 For
some, it is the result of a process of shedding or peeling away
other cultural influences, perhaps like a kind of exfoliation, that
makes it possible, in poet Billy Collins’s words, to “recognize the
sound of my own writing.”10 This permission granted to oneself to
abandon a “borrowed sensibility” and put one’s “own accents into
the language,” as the novelist Saul Bellow once put it,11 suggests
that the locating of one’s writing voice is a process that is personally liberating. The sense that voice is bound up with one’s
4. This more deterministic view posits that an individual author does less to influence the character of writing than do these external social forces. Id. at xviii (discussing
the views of Marxist and cultural critics); Toby Fulwiler, Looking and Listening for My
Voice, in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON VOICE AND WRITING, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing social
constructionist position).
5. Nicholas J. Aversa & Michael Tritt, Voice in Writing, 20 MCGILL J. OF EDUC. 240,
240–42 (1985) (discussing Romantic and process theories of writing and authorship).
6. Id. at 243. This more complex view, the authors indicate, is compatible with the
idea that an individual author may have more than a single persona. Id.
7. Peter Elbow, What Do We Mean When We Talk About Voice in Texts?, in VOICES ON
VOICE: PERSPECTIVES, DEFINITIONS, INQUIRY 9 (Kathleen Blake Yancey ed., 1994); see also
BEN YAGODA, THE SOUND ON THE PAGE: STYLE AND VOICE IN WRITING at xxxi–xxxii (2004).
8. Fulwiler, supra note 4, at 163.
9. For example, Donald Murray has asserted that “[v]oice is the writer revealed.”
Aversa & Tritt, supra note 5, at 241 (quoting DONALD MURRAY, WRITE TO LEARN 144
(1984)).
10. YAGODA, supra note 8, at 123 (quoting Billy Collins).
11. Id. at 116 (quoting Saul Bellow).
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individuality, revealing something distinctive and selfauthenticating about one’s use of language and thinking, has
been linked to an expressivist orientation.12
Scholarly inquiries about the voice of legal writing tend to
begin from the perspective of professional role, although they also
raise the issue of self-identifying expression. Often these inquiries
proceed by disaggregating voice into more specific rhetorical
dimensions. For example, commentators have drawn attention to
the relationship between professional and personal voice,13 and
differentiated within professional voice between common laworiented and scholarly legal voice.14 Christopher Rideout’s illuminating study distinguishes between discoursal voice and a more
distinct authorial presence,15 which he associates with a “public”
as contrasted with a purely personal, or private, voice.16 Drawing
on the work of linguistics scholar Roz Ivanic, Rideout associates
authorial presence with the idea of a writer’s self-representation
or persona.17 Discoursal voice, by contrast, is linked to specific
legal genres, such as appellate briefs and predictive
memoranda.18 Writing of this kind that is part of such established
legal genres exemplifies “typified” voice, comprising the voices of
those who have previously contributed to these genres.19
If legal writing voice is at minimum a professional voice,
recognizable in part by the legal genre to which it is linked, then
differences in writing role, context, and audience should be useful
entry points for analyzing voice in a professional legal context.
Moreover, if professional voice is also inflected by an author’s expressive attributes, then giving attention to authors’ rhetorical
framing and expressive choices should enhance understanding of
how legal writing is voiced. Starting from this more nuanced conception of legal writing voice, we might then ask: Are there attributes that distinguish the voice of legal writing produced in a
judicial context?
12. For a helpful discussion of the expressivist understanding of voice in the context of
writing pedagogy, see J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15
LEGAL WRITING 67, 78, 82–86 (2009).
13. Id. at 82–86 (discussing commentary).
14. Julius G. Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577, 578–81 (1988).
15. Rideout, supra note 12, at 94–95.
16. Id. at 101–05.
17. Id. at 94–97.
18. See id. at 86–88.
19. Id. at 87–89.
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A. Genre-Based Voice in Judicial Writing
Drawing on the work of commentators and theorists of
judicial writing, one entry point for responding to this query is to
consider the more familiar genre-based idea that judicial voice is
tied to the function of opinion writing—that is, resolving specific
litigated claims and, in the process, developing doctrine. Often we
associate this functional or genre-based conception of judicial
opinion voice with the attributes of declaration and authoritativeness, and a “rhetoric of inevitability.”20 Yet such a formulation
seems incomplete because a judicial opinion encompasses more
than the authoritative and justifying voice of the decision maker.
An opinion also engages in persuasion; like a good advocate who
addresses her arguments to the court, the judicial author must
satisfy readers—and the author herself—that the opinion’s
reasoning and results are analytically and jurisprudentially
sound.21 And in doing so, an opinion may also draw on the explanatory and analytic voice of a bench memo. For this reason, in
the rhetorical situation of the opinion, we can identify judicial
voice not only with judicial opinions themselves but also in relation to other modes of writing (genres)22 produced in a judicial
context to which the opinion is related: specifically, clerkauthored bench memos and advocate-authored briefs to the court.
Thus, because an appellate judicial opinion will bear traces of the
functions of bench memos and briefs that are addressed to the
appellate court, genre-based judicial voice subsumes the features
that we associate with the brief and the bench memo.

20. See Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 201, 210–16 (1990).
21. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 166–67,
176, 216 (2000).
22. Theories of genre are drawn from the fields of literature, linguistics, and rhetoric.
A long dominant conception equates genre with the classification of forms of writing. Amy
J. Devitt, Generalizing About Genre: New Conceptions of an Old Concept, 44 C.
COMPOSITION & COMM. 573, 574 (1993). A more contemporary application of genre theory
includes within the idea of genre “purposes, participants, and themes” and thus embraces
a rhetorical and surrounding social “situation.” Id. at 575–76. Modern genre theory posits
genre as dynamic; genre is implicated when readers respond with recognition to recurring
situations in appropriate ways. Id. at 578–79. At the same time, writers approaching a
writing task must define the context and thus construct the situation involved in the task.
Id. Under this more nuanced conception, genre is central to writing. Id. at 584. Even
reconceptualized as involving recurring situation or writing context rather than form,
genre is distinguishable from the writer’s persona or expressive style, as developed infra.

194

The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute

Vol. 20

B. Authorial Voice in Judicial Writing
Another entry point for analyzing judicial voice is the idea
that voice is a manifestation of an opinion author’s own expressive choices and style, a view of voice that is closer to that of a
writer’s persona23 or public voice24 than a purely unmediated expression from within. This mode of analysis emphasizes the individuality of judicial authors and offers as evidence jurists’ writing
that has gained a reputation as stylistically distinctive, from
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s epigrams25 and Robert Jackson’s
nuance26 to Antonin Scalia’s affected indignation—a variation,
Laura Krugman Ray suggests, on the rhetorical device of the
dramatic monologue.27
Yet, as commentators have noted, the notion of individual
judicial style is complicated by the role that judicial clerks often
take on in drafting opinions.28 To be sure, judges as authors
occupy various points on a spectrum from allowing clerks
considerable leeway in writing initial drafts,29 to more or less
collaborative writing relationships,30 to self-authorship.31
23. See Rideout, supra note 12, at 94–97.
24. See id. at 101–05.
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & Thomas E. O’Connell, Book Review of: The Essential
Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 513, 522–32 (1995); Judith Schenck Koffler, Forged Alliance: Law and Literature, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1374, 1376 n.5 (1989).
26. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme
Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 208–11 (2002) [hereafter Judicial Personality].
27. Id. at 226–29.
28. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (and Do They Matter)?, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1429–32 (1995) (arguing the judicial clerks tend to write in a “pure”
style identified by extensive quoting and citation of authority and use of formal legal terminology); Laura Krugman Ray, Judging the Justices, A Supreme Court Performance
Review, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2003) [hereafter Judging the Justices] (noting that
law clerks infuse opinions with a “law review style of writing” marked by impersonality
and extensive footnoting); see also John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86
MINN. L. REV. 447, 487 (2001).
29. Peter B. Rutledge, Review Essay on Sorcerers’ Apprentices and Courtiers of
the Marble Palace, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 396–97 (2007) (review essay on
ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006) and TODD C.
PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006)).
30. E.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 206–11
(1994) (outlining his preference for collaboration with clerks);YAGODA, supra note 7, at
169–70 (discussing Justice Stephen Breyer’s approach to working with his clerks).
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However, the practice of widespread judicial self-authorship
dating particularly to the era when Franklin Roosevelt appointed
distinctive judicial stylists to the Supreme Court32 does not seem
easily replicable today. Under contemporary practice, some appellate courts rely not only on “elbow” or term clerks but a pool of
staff attorneys who often author unpublished opinions to resolve
specific cases before the court.33
Further complicating the idea of judicial voice in this
authorial sense is the recognition that judicial authors who
undertake to do the principal work of writing an opinion do not
write in a vacuum. Rather, an appellate judge who is designated
to write an opinion must address her colleagues’ questions, comments, and critiques after drafts of the opinion are circulated.34
And when colleagues’ critiques are captured in one or more separate opinions, often the author of the main opinion will respond
directly to these concurring or dissenting opinions, either in the
text of the opinion or in one or more footnotes. In addition to the
influence that judicial colleagues bear in shaping an opinion’s
text, judicial authors also may invoke other authors’ specific ideas
and language, that is, from the litigants’ briefs and from their
clerks’ memoranda.
In light of the many nuances that attend any consideration of
judicial voice, and the ways in which the two dimensions of voice
overlap, I argue that we should reorient thinking away from an
“either/or” formulation in which judicial opinion voice is either
typified and genre-based or reflective of authorial choice to a
richer conception that embraces “both/and.” Specifically, I argue
that we should locate judicial voice in both the attributes of the
writing and the writer. This argument finds some support in
Mikhail Bakhtin’s linguistic and literary theory, particularly his
idea of heteroglossia. Although developed as a theory of novelistic
discourse, the concept has a more general formulation
31. E.g., Ray, Judicial Personality, supra note 26, at 226.
32. Id. at 195–221.
33. For a discussion of the authorship implications of non-publication see Patricia M.
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writing, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1371, 1373–77 (1995).
34. See, for example, Linda Greenhouse’s discussion of the process of exchange and
commentary that led to evolution of the draft that became the majority opinions in Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 80–101 (2005).
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highlighting for Bakhtin the nature of language, which “like the
living concrete environment in which the consciousness of the
verbal artist lives is never unitary.”35 Rather, “language is
heteroglot from top to bottom,” in the sense that it consists of
multiple “forms for conceptualizing the world in words,” forms
that intersect with and may even contradict one another.36
This rejection of the idea that language is unitary also has
implications for the concept of voice. For Bakhtin, words are fluid
and can be appropriated but, until then, they are “half someone
else’s,” existing in “other people’s mouths, in other people’s
contexts, serving other people’s intentions.”37 His references to
“form”38 and his locating of language in the exchanges between
people, I will suggest, support an idea of genre-based voice (form)
and the distinctive interventions of an authorial voice (appropriation).
Understanding writing in terms of voice shares some ground
with rhetorical analysis in that a sensibility about voice requires
attention to rhetorical choices that, in turn, help to illuminate
both genre-based and authorial voice. However, I argue that
attending to voice involves an aural dimension beyond a surface
analysis of rhetoric: it entails noting the way in which a writing
includes patterns and shifts in language that produce an aural
effect. This aural dimension includes the tone, rhythms,
repetitions, emphases, and exaggerations that we can “hear”
when a court especially presses a point or refutes it, when it seeks
to disarm it or to shore it up. Cultivating an ear for how a judicial
writing is voiced can help us attend to the points in an opinion in
which the crucial work of analytic reasoning is occurring, or when
it is breaking down. As I will attempt to demonstrate, focusing on
voice involves close analysis of how a writing is pitched, and
35. MIKHAIL M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 288 (Michael
Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981).
36. Id. at 291–92.
37. Id. at 293–94; see also Rideout, supra note 12, at 87 nn.77–83 (discussing Bakhtin’s dialogism, the idea that all use of language involves borrowing and appropriation
from others’ prior uses).
38. Bakhtin’s essay, Discourse in the Novel, seems to link “form” to a mode for “manifesting intentions” that is “used to convey meaning.” BAKHTIN, supra note 35, at 289, 290.
In explicating “genre,” he points to a relationship between genre and form: “Certain features of language take on the specific flavor of a given genre: they knit together with specific points of view, specific approaches, forms of thinking, nuances and accents characteristic of the given genre.” Id. at 289.
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modulated, and the ways in which it resonates. Becoming attuned
to whether a writing’s voice is confident or self-conscious, assured
or overwrought, understated or strident, allows the audiences of
judicial opinions to get at something deeper in a writing than its
surface rhetoric: these variations in voice signal tensions, shifts,
contradictions, and gaps in doctrinal reasoning. “Listening” for
these variations offers an analytic resource to the interpretive
repertoire of law students and their teachers, lawyers, judges,
other close readers, and judicial authors themselves as they work
through the writing and analytic process.
III.

A BROADER CONCEPTION OF WRITING AND WRITER
IN A JUDICIAL CONTEXT

Pursuing the question whether there is an identifiable voice
for judicial writing, in this part, I develop the idea that the investigation of judicial voice requires analysis not only of writing by
judicial authors but also writing intended for judges, what I will
refer to as writing in a judicial context. Typically this expanded
idea of the kinds of writing we must examine to understand judicial voice begins with a bench memo, in which the writer prepares
an objective, explanatory analysis of law and legal arguments for
a judge’s consideration.39 That analysis entails reading and
digesting the briefs of the parties, which are also written for a
judge, but for the distinct purpose of advancing a legal argument.
The variations in writing voice appropriate to each of these
writings—what we might tentatively refer to as the authoritative
and justifying voice of the opinion, the assertive voice of the brief,
and the explanatory voice of the bench memo—reflect functional
features of each genre rooted in the purpose and audience of these
writings. At the same time, the fact that these writings share a

39. Not all judges require bench memos. The late Judge Frank Coffin of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals preferred the directness of oral exchanges with his clerks, and the
time savings that that practice entailed. COFFIN, supra note 30, at 196–97. Some members
of the bench are selective when assigning a full-blown analytic memo. For example, former
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell calibrated memos in terms of “‘major research memos, full memos, and “bobtail” bench memos’” on the basis of the importance of the legal
issue involved. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3–4 (2006) (quoting Letter from
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene J. Comey, Tyler A. Baker, Charles C. Ames, and David A.
Martin (June 3, 1977), in Powell Papers Box 130b)).
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judicial context and exist in relation to one another suggests linkages and intersections in the way they are voiced.
Moreover, because, as I have suggested, judicial voice implicates not only the conventions of a genre (the writing) but also the
expressive choices of the author, this part will address as well the
authorial dimension of voice. Specifically, I suggest that authorial
voice in judicial opinions is never unitary but actually the product
of engagement among writers—encompassing judges, judicial
clerks, and brief writing advocates—speaking to one another. To
be sure, the genre-based and authorial aspects of voice shade into
one another and often will overlap. However, the discussion to
follow will distinguish between them where useful to highlight
what each can contribute to an understanding of voice in a
judicial context.
A. The Bench Memo
1.

Genre-Based Voice

Drawing on the parties’ arguments, the judicial clerk, unlike
the brief writer, writes not as an advocate seeking to persuade a
decision maker, but rather as an employee in a confidential
professional relationship. The clerk is expected to write in a
genre-based voice that explains, analyzes, and evaluates law, fact,
and the parties’ claims and arguments to help a judge prepare for
oral argument and post-argument conferences with the judge’s
colleagues on the bench.40 Occurring as it does within the context
of litigation, the clerk’s writing task is very much grounded in the
specificities of the parties’ actual arguments and theories of the
case.
To do this preparatory work effectively, judicial clerks need to
internalize the arguments; that is, they must be able to
paraphrase rather than merely to quote them, and to distill from
them the most important points. In this genre-based understanding of voice, the bench memo writer needs to step back from the
brief writers’ characterizations of the law and assess the doctrine
as well as the arguments fashioned from it, independently,
screening out the glosses of the advocate. In effect, the bench
memo writer is tasked with accurately communicating the gist of
40. See id. at 3, 155.
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the parties’ arguments without lapsing into an advocacy voice,
while also assessing the arguments for doctrinal accuracy. Such a
nuanced writing role calls for a memo-writing voice that is
focused and focusing, rooted in the function of a bench memo; it
requires a voice that is confident enough to direct the judicial
reader’s attention, but sufficiently self-effacing to subordinate
itself to the theory of argument and the judicial reader’s need for
a clear exposition of its substance to help prepare for oral
argument.
The practice in the United States Supreme Court is for a
clerk to draft bench memos for the clerk’s individual Justice rather than to write a memo that is shared by the other chambers41
(the prevailing practice, by contrast, when the Court reviews
certiorari petitions).42 That the audience for a bench memo is
individualized allows the clerk to fashion it in a way that accords
with the Justice’s intellectual predilections and ways of working.
Thus, it may encompass a range of discursive styles. But when
the bench memo is drafted by a relatively junior lawyer lacking
the Justice’s experience and authority, as is the case in the
United States Supreme Court, one might expect it to reflect a
deferential relationship.
Working from Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun’s
voluminous personal papers, Linda Greenhouse’s magisterial
Becoming Justice Blackmun offers a rare glimpse into the
language of Supreme Court bench memos.
Detailing the
intellectual process by which Justice Blackmun grappled with the
issues in Roe v. Wade, including the Justice’s productive interaction with his clerks, Greenhouse quotes from the thirty-ninepage bench memo prepared for what proved to be the first of two
arguments in Roe. The text reveals a genre-based voice that is
measured, and somewhat tentative, which seems consistent with
the function of the bench memo and the nature of the relationship
between writer and audience.
Discussing a Georgia statute that a district court held violated a pregnant woman’s right to privacy and personal liberty, the
clerk suggested some doubt about the district court’s approach,
which he opined was “supportable but difficult to reach because of
the strong recognition it accords the woman’s right as against
41. See Rutledge, supra note 29, at 393–94.
42. Id. at 385–94.
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other interests.”43 The memo went on to suggest that “[p]erhaps a
better way of approaching it is to reason not that the woman’s
right is so strong but that to permit other criteria in these statutes [other than a doctor’s view of the best course for the patient]
is in the end to restrict medical judgment about what is best for
each woman.”44
In addition to the use of equivocating language (“perhaps”),
the memo suggests an endorsement of one approach (grounding
the case in a physician’s interests) over another, arguably weaker
alternative rather than a full embrace of the seemingly preferred
ground of decision. It is also steeped in the language of reasoned
analysis consistent with its genre: one view is “supportable” but
the preferred course is framed explicitly in terms of reasoning: a
better way is to “reason not” that one right is strong but to
predicate the ruling on the need to preserve a doctor’s exercise of
medical judgment. When Justice Blackmun asked a clerk from a
later term for an analysis of Justice Powell’s suggestion that the
right to an abortion should be linked to viability of a fetus rather
than the end of the first trimester of a pregnancy, the clerk
responded more definitively, although still with some caution:
While the trimester is, as you admit, an arbitrary cutoff, I
don’t think that it is all that arbitrary, and I would not want
to prejudge a state’s interests during the ‘interim’ period
between the end of the first trimester and viability at this
time. I would stand by your original position.”45

43. GREENHOUSE, supra note 34, at 81.
44. Id. at 81–82. Among other things, the Georgia statute required confirmation of a
doctor’s judgment concerning the necessity of having an abortion by two independent physicians’ assessments, that the procedure be performed in an accredited hospital, and approved by a hospital committee, and that the procedure be limited to Georgia residents. Id.
at 78; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192–200 (1973) (discussing and invalidating
these provisions). As Linda Greenhouse notes, id. at 99, Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe
v. Wade makes clear that its rationale was mainly grounded in the right of a physician to
exercise medical judgment:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973).
45. GREENHOUSE, supra note 34, at 96.
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The caution here does not suggest lack of certainty so much
as a disposition to decide, or to commit to, as little as is necessary
“at this time” on a legal issue—the extent of a state’s interests in
protecting a women’s health—that might require further
delineation.
2.

Authorial Voice

In addition to attending to the facts and the issues, in the
Supreme Court context bench memos may also set out a
rhetorical presentation of judicial reasoning commensurate with
clerks’ conception of their judicial employer’s voice. Here, then,
the idea of authorial voice becomes relevant. A seventy-one-page
bench memo to Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke46 concerning the legality of race-conscious
admission policies in a state-supported medical school offers some
evidence of how issues of authorial voice can surface. Justice
Powell’s clerk sketched out the approach that Justice Powell, who
would author the main opinion in the case, ultimately adopted.
Tellingly, the memo began with the moderating observation that
this author-surrogate sought “to map out a middle ground which
will avoid the dire consequences each side predicts if it should
lose.”47 By contrast, when William Rehnquist clerked for Justice
Robert Jackson and addressed the issue of segregation challenged
in Brown v. Board of Education,48 his assessment of the state of
the law on the “separate but equal” doctrine was frank and conscious that his understanding diverged from the developing view.
Rehnquist wrote, “I realize that it is an unpopular and
unh[u]manitarian position, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson49 was
right and should be affirmed.”50
To be sure, the content and tone of these memo excerpts of
themselves offer limited, if highly specific, evidence of authorial
voice. That bench memos are written in the context of a clerkjudge relationship contemplates that they will convey the
46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
47. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 52 (quoting Letter from Robert D. Comfort to
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Aug. 29, 1977), Powell Papers Box 46).
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 41 (quoting DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER:
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 161 (2d ed. 1990)).
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formality and hierarchy inherent in that professional context, and
here consideration of authorial and genre-based voice intersect.
However, the voice of a bench memo will also reflect the particularities of the working relationship and the preferences and
priorities of the judge for whom they are written. The relationship
may be more or less “egalitarian,” at least in the recollection of
one Felix Frankfurter clerk,51 but typically the work expectations
are rigorous,52 in keeping with the invited intellectual exchange.
Justice O’Connor similarly promoted lawyerly exchanges in her
chambers. She expected a detailed bench memo on every case that
was orally argued.53 After a clerk completed the task, the Justice
would ask her other clerks54 to draft “countermemos” if they did
not concur with the first clerk’s conclusions.55
3.

Bench Memos and Opinions

These examples suggest the complex ways in which bench
memos can operate in the broader context of judicial writing. If
the voice of the bench memo is principally rooted in the
specificities of the bench memo genre, the explanatory and
analytic functions of that genre have a role to play in the judicial
opinion as well, placing the two in functional relation to one
another. The idea of authorial voice is also at issue when a memowriting clerk approximates a judicial employer’s rhetorical
approach, as in the Bakke memo, or when clerk authors are encouraged to lay out a position dialogically, vis-a-vis other clerks.
Recognizing the role that the bench memo can play in developing
the structure and reasoning of an opinion offers us a more
nuanced understanding of the idea of voice in a judicial context,
one that embraces functions of the bench memo as a genre and

51. Id. at 41 (quoting former Frankfurter clerk Alexander Bickel).
52. See, e.g., id. (detailing how Justice Frankfurter claimed to engage with his clerks
without hierarchy, in a relation in which “no deference to position is permitted, no yessing,
however much some of them in the beginning be awed”; at the same time, he professed to
be a “very exacting task-master; no nonsense, intellectually speaking, is tolerated, no
short-cuts,” suggesting that memos were written in a voice that was nothing if not careful
and rigorously analytic) (quoting LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL
BIOGRAPHY 415 (1984)).
53. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
216 (2007).
54. Since 1974 each Supreme Court Justice has been afforded four clerks. Id. at 45.
55. Id. at 216.
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the stylistic preferences of clerks and the judges to whom they
write.56
B. The Brief
Of course, to draft the bench memo, the judicial clerk must
analyze the persuasiveness of written arguments developed in the
briefs of the parties (and amici curiae). This entails a close reading and evaluation of the briefs both for the analytic rigor and
logical persuasiveness of the arguments and for the more distinctive authorial features that “speak” to anticipated readers (structure, thematic development, choice of language, emphasis and
extent of reasoning, choice of authority). Thus, the brief writer’s
skill in projecting an effective advocacy voice—both genre-based
and authorial—is a crucial component in reaching and persuading
the brief’s intended audience and evaluators—the judge and also
the judge’s clerk.
1.

Genre-Based Voice

How do decision makers assess advocacy? In Minding the
Law, Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner analyze the
rhetorical situation in which judges evaluate efforts at
persuasion. The authors emphasize conventional, genre-based
features rooted in the function of advocacy that warrant a decision maker’s wariness, a caution born of a sense that arguments
are “presumably self-interested” and possibly “customdesigned.”57 They posit that underlying legal discourse is the idea
of contestability, that contestability in turn triggers an impulse to
discredit, which implies that efforts to persuade will seem selfinterested and become suspect.58 If an arbiter, recognizing that
the function of an argument is to be persuasive, accepts this set of
assumptions about legal argument, then, ironically, the work of
an effective advocate may seem particularly suspect.59
56. It is true the reader of an opinion will not have access to the bench memo and will
not be in a position to assess the interplay between the memo and the opinion. However,
the aim here is to bring to light that other writers contribute to the concept of judicial
voice.
57. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 174.
58. Id. at 173–175.
59. Id. at 174. This understanding of the premises underlying persuasive argument is
not necessarily in tension with the idea that good advocacy should demonstrate ethos, or
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But if wariness rather than an expectation of straightforward, transparent argument is the dominant mindset of a decision maker, how can advocates disarm it? Here, Amsterdam and
Bruner suggest that advocates essentially need to avoid appeals
that too obviously seem as if they are designed simply to
persuade; rather, advocates must preserve a degree of
“deniability.”60 The authors identify rhetorical techniques that are
“staples of persuasion” because they aim to “conceal . . . contestability” and overcome the problem of argumentation that too
obviously seems calculated to persuade:61 Ontological construction
techniques62 suggest that the advocate’s position is solid and
substantial; epistemological techniques63 highlight the certainty
of one’s position or the indeterminacy of the opposing interpretation; culturally resonant narratives can prompt an arbiter to
suspend disbelief;64 and prototypes and metaphor can imbue one’s
language with desired meanings.65
2.

Authorial Voice

If these approaches are part of a genre of persuasion, it seems
fair to conclude that the extent to which they are used
successfully in advocacy is in part a function of what the individual writer contributes—authorial framing and rhetorical skill. To
test how these authorial features might be voiced in advocacy
writing, the briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court in
the historic case, National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,66 are illuminating. The underlying litigation generated
considerable attention because it addressed the constitutionality
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, known in some
circles as Obamacare. The Government’s brief in support of the
credibility, and integrity. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 125
(2013), quoted in Gregory Johnson, Credibility in Advocacy: Humility as the First Step, 39
VT. B.J. 22, Fall 2013. Here, Amsterdam and Bruner seem most concerned with the interplay between an advocate’s and an arbiter’s expectations about how the other understands
persuasiveness. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 176.
60. Id. at 174–76. An arbiter, Amsterdam and Bruner go so far as to posit, is likely to
be guided by the principle of caveat emptor. Id. at 174.
61. Id. at 175–77.
62. Id. at 177–84.
63. Id. at 184–86.
64. Id. at 186–97.
65. Id. at 187–92.
66. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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controversial minimum-coverage (individual mandate) provision
began with a comprehensive statement of the purpose of the Act
that set out the parameters of the problem: health insurance is
the principal means for paying for health care services; affordable
health insurance is not widely available; and many uninsured
persons participate in the market for health care, resulting in
shifts in the costs of care to others.67 The brief went on to show
how the Affordable Care Act (ACA) seeks to remedy the problem,68 then delved into the many years of failed federal efforts to
enact comprehensive health care reform, the efforts of states to do
so, and differences in the states’ reform efforts depending on
whether the state laws included a minimum-coverage provision
comparable to that enacted by the federal government.69
The Supreme Court ultimately sustained the Act using the
Government’s alternative argument under Congress’ taxing power.70 But in its principal point of argument, the Government justified the legislation based mainly on the Commerce Clause and
drew support as well from the Necessary and Proper Clause. 71
Advancing this rationale, the Government offered two theories of
argument to show that the minimum-coverage provision regulates
how people finance health care: (1) the provision was part of a
broader regulatory scheme governing how consumption of health
care was financed, and (2) the provision regulates economic conduct with a substantial effect on interstate commerce.72
Two sets of respondents (state and private) filed briefs in
response. To illustrate the contrast with the Government’s
approach, this section will focus attention on the State
Respondents’ brief, which emphasized the following points: the
text of the Commerce Clause authorizes only regulation of
interstate
commerce; the minimum-coverage provision was unprecedented in that it was no mere regulation of commerce but
rather a mandate that uninsured people enter commerce; and the
provision would coerce individuals in disregard of the structural
67. Brief of Petitioners, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Services v. Florida, 2012 WL 37168, at *3–8 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11398) (minimum coverage provision).
68. Id. at *9–12.
69. Id. at *12–16.
70. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594–2600.
71. Brief of Petitioners, 2012 WL 37168, at *17–20 (summary of argument).
72. Id. at *17–19 (summary of argument).
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limits of the Constitution that reserve exercise of police power to
states. The opening of the Summary of Argument captured this
idea:
The individual mandate is an unprecedented law that
rests on an extraordinary and unbounded assertion of
federal power. Under any faithful reading of the
Constitution’s enumeration of limited federal powers, the
mandate cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce, not the power to compel individuals to enter into
commerce. That distinction is fundamental. 73

As legal writing authority Ross Guberman74 has observed, the
Government’s brief effectively used choices about rhetorical framing and emphasis—aspects of authorial voice—to demonstrate
through statistics and economically-based argument that a health
care crisis existed. It also scored points in Guberman’s assessment for including citations both to a conservative-leaning judge
who voted to uphold the ACA in the lower courts and to Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment in Gonzalez v. Raich,75
which took an expansive view of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority when augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Yet
what the Government’s brief lacked, Guberman opined, was a
counter-theme to the State Respondents’ “unprecedented and unbounded power” theme, which it wove into every part of its brief.
The State Respondents’ brief had an effective authorial voice including a “crisp” narrative and clear-cut examples to illustrate the
implications of allowing the federal government to require the
purchase of minimum health insurance coverage.76
73. Brief of State Respondents, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, sub nom. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Services v. Florida, 2012 WL 392550, at *10–11 (U.S. Feb. 6,
2012) (No. 11-398) (minimum coverage provision) (emphasis in original); see also id. at *17
(“The power to regulate … ongoing commercial intercourse is precisely what the framers
intended to confer. The power to force individuals to engage in commercial transactions
against their will was the kind of police power that they reserved to state governments
more directly accountable to the people (or ‘applicable individuals,’ as the ACA would have
it).”).
74. Ross Guberman heads a consulting and training firm for advanced legal writing, is
a Professorial Lecturer in Law at The George Washington University Law School, and the
author of POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP ADVOCATES (2d ed. 2014).
75. 545 U.S. 1, 33–42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
76. Ross Guberman critiques the Government’s health care brief,
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If we apply Amsterdam and Bruner’s rhetorical framework,
the State Respondents’ brief tapped into a culturally resonant
narrative about federal government overreach and threats to
cherished individual autonomy—“A power to compel individuals
to enter into commerce would amount to a plenary power to compel individuals to live their day-to-day lives according to
Congress’ dictates.”77 It presented its theme that the legislation
constituted an unprecedented and unbounded application of federal power with a level of confidence approaching epistemological
certainty—“The power that the federal government asserts is as
unbounded as it is unprecedented. Indeed, the federal government’s effort to liken the Affordable Care Act to more familiar
legislation only succeeds in highlighting the complete absence of
any limiting principle for the power asserted.”78 The brief offered
concrete examples showing that the Government’s interpretation
of the Commerce Clause power underpinning the legislation had
no limiting principles—for example, under the Government’s
view, the Commerce Clause power could easily be applied to
require the purchase of a car. The brief’s use of examples offered
rhetorical solidity as against the Government’s more economic
data-driven and less tangible explanations—“There is no
principled reason why the asserted power to compel individuals to
purchase insurance could not be exercised to compel individuals
to purchase cars.”79 In short, the State Respondents’ more artful
and effective authorial choices in its Commerce Clause argument—their rhetorical framing, thematic repetition, and diction—
led to a clear and resonant advocacy voice.
3.

Briefs and Opinions: Echoes of the Advocate’s Voice

Like bench memos, advocacy briefs are an integral part of the
rhetorical situation in which judges write. As noted, the voice of a
brief is partly rooted in genre-based attributes linked to the need
to make persuasive argument seem less obviously so and less
likely to be viewed with skepticism.80 At the same time, a brief’s
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/ross-guberman-critiques-the-governmentshealth-care-brief/.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Brief of State Respondents, 2012 WL 392550, at *37.
Id. at *24.
Id. at *7.
See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text.
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effectiveness in concealing contestability and dispelling suspicion
of self-interestedness is tied to an author’s rhetorical skill.81 These
two aspects of voice in advocacy briefs are closely intertwined.
The success with which a brief overcomes these challenges to
persuasiveness will increase the likelihood that it will actually
persuade and perhaps influence the structure and reasoning of an
opinion.
To demonstrate, I return to the discussion of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius begun in section
III(B)(2) to illustrate how judicial opinions internalize the rhetoric
and framing of advocacy directed to them. In the Supreme
Court’s recent ruling, both Chief Justice Roberts’ main opinion
and the opinion of the quartet of dissenters (Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) bear the traces of the State
Respondents’ rhetorical framing.
For example, taking up the Commerce Clause argument, the
Chief Justice opined that “Congress has never attempted to rely
on [the commerce] power to compel individuals not engaged in
commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”82 Drawing on the
Respondents’ theme of lack of precedent for a legislative purchasing mandate, the opinion quoted from a case referring to the “lack
of historical precedent”83 and made the case for careful consideration of legislation that entailed a “new conception[ ] of federal
power.”84 Opining that both the language of the Constitution and
Commerce Clause precedent “reflect[ ] the natural understanding
that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to
be regulated”85 and that the minimum-coverage (individual mandate) provision “compels individuals to become active in commerce
by purchasing a product,”86 the opinion again takes up the idea of
novelty and lack of precedent: “Construing the Commerce Clause
to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they
are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain
to congressional activity.”87
81. See supra notes 66–79 and accompanying text.
82. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586.
83. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3159 (2010)).
84. 132 S. Ct. at 2568.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2587 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Moving to the Government’s argument under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the opinion reinforced both the idea that regulation presupposes the existence of something to regulate (the
individual mandate ”vests Congress with the extraordinary
ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an
enumerated power”)88 and that the mandate exceeds the
structural limits of the Constitution on federal power (“[b]ut we
have also carried out our responsibility to declare
unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of
government established by the Constitution”).89
The jointly written dissent also echoed the State
Respondents’ brief in emphasizing structural limits, the lack of
precedent for, and the extraordinary reach of, the minimumcoverage provision: the ”unprecedented”90 individual mandate
expands federal power into a “broad new field” that is “limitless”;
“further.”91 Further, “if every person comes within the Commerce
Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple reason that he
will one day engage in commerce, the idea of a limited
Government power is at an end.”92
In short, although neither the main opinion nor the joint
dissent cited the State Respondents’ brief directly in their discussion of the individual mandate, each of the opinions resonated
with its rhetoric and ideas: as an unprecedented assertion of federal power, the mandate was extraordinary and thus an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. The frequent repetition
of that idea in the brief, and appeal to Justices inclined to limit
rather than expand federal power, demonstrate how an advocacy
voice can find expression in the rhetorical context of the opinion:
judicial opinion voice can internalize the persuasive framing of
the advocate and, in the Bakhtinian sense, plausibly be “half
someone else’s.”93

88. Id. at 2592.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
93. See BAKHTIN, supra note 35, at 293–94; Rideout, supra note 12, at 87 nn.77–83
(discussing Bakhtin’s dialogism, the idea that all use of language involves borrowing and
appropriation from others’ prior uses); supra text accompanying note 37.
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C. The Opinion
The judicial opinion is the culmination of the rhetorical
efforts of the bench memo, the briefs, and the oral argument.
Whether written by the judge, the judicial clerk, or in some collaborative arrangement between the two, the opinion, as a genre,
not only announces an outcome but also elaborates the rationale—doctrinally based, fact-, or policy-driven—that supports
it.94 This genre-based voice of the opinion is thus at once
authoritative, directing a disposition that binds the parties, and
justifying, in that it sets out its reasons for ruling in the way that
it has.95 But upon deeper analysis of opinions, it would be misguided to conceive of the opinion’s genre-based voice as unitary:
although the dispositional and justifying functions of an opinion
give it a fairly consistent and identifiable genre-based voice, as
noted, the judicial opinion also incorporates functions of the bench
memo and advocate’s brief genres.96 Moreover, the authorial voice
of the opinion is itself a complex phenomenon to which the
authors of other judicially oriented writings contribute.97
1.

Voice in the Main Opinion
a.

Genre-based voice

John Leubsdorf’s catalogue of the attributes of a judicial
opinion highlight how an opinion subsumes the functions of other
legal and even literary genres:
An opinion works in differing but related ways. Like a novel,
it portrays a human conflict. Like a letter, it intervenes in
the conflict it portrays. Like a treatise, it gives a systematic
analysis meant to be applicable to many situations. Like a
work of history or criticism, it compares disputes that have
occurred over the years and analyzes what past authors
have proposed. Like a dialogue, it embraces clashing approaches to the conflict before the court. Like a script or

94. See Wald, supra note 33, at 1374–77; see generally James Boyd White, Judicial
Opinion Writing— What’s an Opinion for?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995).
95. See Ferguson, supra note 20, at 210–16.
96. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 166–67, 176, 216.
97. See supra notes 35–37.
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computer program, it gives instructions to those who act and
decide. Like an oration, it seeks to persuade.98

If the genre-based voice of the judicial opinion incorporates
these multiple functions, the authorial voice, particularly in an
opinion issued by a multimember appellate court, similarly is not
singular. The very process of circulating and considering opinion
drafts among judges and clerks in chambers, in addition to the
influence of briefs and lower court opinions in the case, ensures
that multiple voices and perspectives are likely to inflect the final
product.99 The following discussion addresses this authorial
aspect of judicial opinion voice.
b.

Multiplicity of Authorial Voice

Variations in rhetorical approach among judicial authors,
whether they write individually or, less commonly, in collaboration, will inflect the authorial dimension of voice of a main opinion. A majority or plurality opinion by Justice Scalia resonates
differently from one written by Justice Breyer or Justice
Ginsburg, even when the contributions of judicial clerks to these
opinions are accounted for. As Justice Breyer himself has noted,
his approach to writing is quite distinct from that of Justice
Scalia. Justice Breyer avers that “[i]n writing, one must understate,” because overstatement, while often effective rhetorically in
conversation, would lend itself to being misunderstood in
writing.100 Nonetheless, he “respect[s] other writing styles that
are different, yet effective,” singling out Justice Scalia’s “dramatic
approach.”101
Still, an authoring Justice often will need to adjust an opinion’s breadth of language and statement of rationale, and possibly
other attributes that mark authorial voice, in an effort to gain the
support of a Court majority.102 In this sense the main opinion will
98. Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 447.
99. See Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 LAW & LIT. 291, 293 (2008); see also
Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 491–94 (discussing the range of voices that may inhabit an
opinion, including those of dissenters and lower court opinion authors, arguments of counsel, the parties, and witnesses).
100. YAGODA, supra note 7, at 170 (quoting Justice Breyer).
101. Id. at 171.
102. Ward, supra note 33, at 1377–80. It is in this sense that the named author speaks
as well for the Court that John Leubsdorf refers to appellate opinions as “double-voiced.”
Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 488–90.
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normally be responsive to, or at least cognizant of, other authorial
voices on the Court. The less common jointly authored opinion
must negotiate differences in individual authorial voice even more
directly. In the case of multiple judicial authors, one might ask
whether it is possible to harmonize authorial voice in the face of
varying emphases and rhetorical choices among co-authors.
The reproductive rights case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,103 offers some insight into the nature of authorial presence in a jointly authored opinion. In Casey,
the members of the heavily fractured Court produced five
opinions. The main opinion, jointly authored by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, struck down a spousal
notification provision in, but otherwise upheld, a Pennsylvania
statute that restricted access to abortion. Equally significant, this
opinion sought to reestablish the precedential vitality of Roe v.
Wade104 countering earlier post-Roe decisions that had “chipped . .
. away” at it.105
Apart from the symbolic importance of the use of the joint
opinion form in this case,106 the implications for authorial voice
were interesting. The main opinion in Casey did not signal how
the authors divided the actual writing work, but extrajudicial
evidence indicates that all three Justices participated in drafting
it.107 Justice Kennedy, whose position in prior cases suggested
that he had reservations with respect to aspects of Roe’s holding,
apparently wrote the opening part affirming the continued
validity of Roe.108 When the Justices read portions of the opinion
from the bench, Justice Kennedy linked himself to another part of
103. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. See Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern
Pro-Life Feminism, 28 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 232, 254 n.157 (2013) (noting that the
Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), “had chipped the
most away at” Roe).
106. See Ray, Judging the Justices, supra note 28, at 219–20. For a more recent analysis of the use of the jointly authored opinion in Casey as an example of “strategic collaboration” and “common ground” though not “perfect agreement,” see Laura Krugman Ray,
Circumstance and Strategy: Jointly Authored Supreme Court Opinions, 12 NEV. L.J. 727,
767–81 (2012) [hereinafter Circumstance and Strategy].
107. TOOBIN, supra note 53, at 54. In his Notes at the conclusion of The Nine, Jeffrey
Toobin states that his principal sources were “not-for-attribution” interviews with Justices
and more than seventy-five of their law clerks. Id. at 342. Toobin notes that the section on
Casey was informed by Justice Blackmun’s papers in the Library of Congress. Id.
108. Id. at 54; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–46.
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the opinion text addressing the philosophical conception of liberty
and deep conundrums of existence: “at the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existing, of meaning, of the
universe and of the mystery of human life.”109
Justice Souter was particularly concerned about addressing
stare decisis principles and contributed that portion of the opinion
(part III), a carefully elaborated discussion of the circumstances
dictating adherence to precedent.110 Justice O’Connor took
responsibility for discussing the constitutional infirmities of the
spousal notification provision.111 Part IV of the opinion, although
not supported by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who joined in
the opinion’s first three parts, also laid out a rationale for adopting an “undue burden” standard, one that Justice O’Connor had
long favored, in place of the three-trimester framework in Roe.112
It was her “pragmatic rhetoric,”—her voice— O’Connor biographer Joan Biskupic has argued, that resounded in the opinion.113
2.

The Separate Voice: Concurrences and Dissents
a.

Genre-Based Voice

If main opinion writers inevitably engage with multiple
authorial voices, commentators typically identify the voice of the
separate opinion, whether uttered as a nuanced concurrence, or in
outright dissent from the majority result and rationale, as
distinctly resonant.114 However, this section argues that even
these writings reflect a dimension of multiplicity of voice, and
here, the distinctions between the genre-based and authorial
voice similarly are not airtight.
Concurrences can serve a variety of functions, from
emphasizing a point made in the majority opinion, to limiting the
109. JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME
COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 272 (2006); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
110. BISKUPIC, supra note 109, at 272; TOOBIN, supra note 53, at 54; see also Casey, 505
U.S. at 854–69.
111. TOOBIN, supra note 53, at 54; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 888–98.
112. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–79.
113. BISKUPIC, supra note 109, at 272.
114. Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, I Beg to Differ: Interdisciplinary Questions About Law, Language and Dissent, in LAW, MYSTERY & THE HUMANITIES: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 141–45, 148, 151–54 (Logan Atkinson & Diana Majury eds., 2008).
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opinion’s reach, to expanding its scope by pointing to other
possible applications, and to positing an alternative legal
rationale for the majority opinion—in effect, a concurrence in the
judgment only.115 Although a characteristic of the concurrence is
that it presents an “internal commentary” on the Court’s ruling
that weakens the authority of the main opinion,116 its voice in a
genre-based sense will vary to some extent according to its
function.117
A more pointed separate writing is that of the dissent. Justice
Brennan, over time an estimable dissenter on the Court,
addressed the function of dissents, arguing that “[d]issents contribute to the integrity of the [judicial] process, not only by directing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority’s opinion
but . . . also by contributing to the marketplace of competing
ideas.”118 In the sense that a dissent can “sow seeds for future
harvest,” the dissent is forward-looking and keeps open the possibility that the Court in a future opinion will adopt that dissent’s
line of reasoning.119 As Marie-Claire Belleau and Rebecca Johnson emphasize in their elaboration on the rhetorical impact of dissents, Justice Brennan’s seed-sowing dissents, as he puts it, “‘soar
with passion and ring with rhetoric.’”120 The function of dissents
of this sort, Belleau and Johnson argue, is to engage “noetic
space,” a term they borrow from Amsterdam and Bruner in
Minding the Law that integrates the rational and the emotional.
It is the space of the imagination that can envision an alternative
way of interpreting or applying the law.121
115. Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the
Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777, 780–81 (1990) [hereinafter Justices Write
Separately].
116. Id. at 783.
117. See id. at 781. For example, Ray highlights two main varieties of concurrence: the
“limiting concurrence” that confines the main holding, and the “expansive concurrence”
that pulls the holding toward other situations. Id. And as with dissents, see Belleau &
Johnson, supra note 114, at 149, and majority opinions, see supra note 102 and accompanying text, the concurrence will adjust its breadth of language and statement of rationale
depending on the constituencies that influence it.
118. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435 (1986).
For an analysis of Justice Brennan’s dissents, see Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan
and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307 (1988) [hereinafter Justice Brennan].
119. Brennan, Justice Brennan, supra note 120, at 431.
120. Belleau & Johnson, supra note 118, at 151 (quoting Brennan, supra note 118, at
431).
121. Id. at 178–179. Belleau & Johnson, supra note 114, at 151–52 (discussing
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Authorial Voice

Even if the dissent as a genre, or sub-genre, given its function
to differ pointedly, offers a more distinct genre-based voice than a
concurrence, both forms of separate opinion may still implicate
multiple authorial voices. First, as in main opinions, other
Justices often join in a separate opinion; thus, the same issues of
negotiation exist about language and rationale that main opinion
writers face. Moreover, the concurring or dissenting voice is never
uttered in a vacuum but rather is heard in dialogue with the main
opinion to which it responds.122 These disparate authors’ voices
are linked precisely because they contest or challenge one
another.
The pointed dialogue between Justice Scalia and Justice
Brennan in dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,123 illustrates the
way in which a dissenting voice resounds in a main opinion, there
a plurality joined in fully by only one other Justice. At issue in the
case was the effort of an unmarried biological father to assert a
liberty-based parental relationship with his daughter, who was
conceived and born while her mother was married to and living
with another man. The plurality concluded that under these
circumstances Michael H., the biological father, had neither a
procedural nor a substantive due process interest in pursuing a
relationship with his daughter.124 To justify this conclusion, the
plurality applied an interpretive approach that sought to identify
a specific tradition in case law allowing the assertion of a parental
interest against the claims of the husband of the child’s mother,
that is, when the presumption of legitimacy would otherwise prevail.125
An unusually long footnote by Justice Scalia and sections of
Justice Brennan’s responsive dissent operate contrapuntally to
underline crucial differences in interpretive methodology. Specifically, Justice Brennan’s dissent took issue with Justice Scalia’s
search for a tradition in the law recognizing the due process
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: HOW COURTS RELY ON
STORYTELLING: AND HOW THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE LAW—
AND OURSELVES (2000)).
122. Belleau & Johnson, supra note 114, at 181.
123. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
124. Id. at 119–21, 122–24.
125. Id. at 126–27 n.6.
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rights of, in his words, an ”adulterous natural father” to pursue a
relationship with his child over the opposition of the child’s
mother who was married to another man at the time of the child’s
conception and who, with her husband, wished to raise the child.
Justice Brennan opined,
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter
only to those interests specifically protected by historical
practice . . . the plurality ignores the kind of society in which
our Constitution exists. We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we
must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even
repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies. Even if we agree, therefore,
that “family “ and “parenthood” are part of the good life, it is
absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of these
terms and destructive to pretend that we do. In a community
such as ours, “liberty” must include the freedom not to conform. The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring
specific approval from history before protecting anything in
the name of liberty.126

In specific refutation of this critique, in footnote six127 Justice
Scalia defended his interpretive method at length:
The need, if arbitrary decision making is to be avoided, to
adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference—
or at least to announce, as Justice Brennan declines to do,
some other criterion for selecting among the innumerable
relevant traditions that could be consulted—is well enough
exemplified by the fact that in the present case Justice
Brennan’s opinion and Justice O’Connor’s opinion . . . which
disapproves this footnote, both appeal to tradition, but on
the basis of the tradition they select reach opposite results.
Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving
judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by
any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at
all.128
126. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy concurred in all but this footnote six in the plurality opinion.
128. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.

2015

Understanding Voice

217

Here, the Justices directly and dialogically engaged one
another’s views of how to determine the relevant category for assessing the existence of a tradition to define a liberty-based
parental interest.129 Whereas Justice Scalia favored “the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified,”130 Justice
Brennan preferred to “ask whether the specific parent-child
relationship under consideration is close enough to the interests
that [the Court] already . . . protected to be deemed an aspect of
‘liberty’ as well.”131 The ensemble of writings that make up the
opinion in the case is inflected by that dialogue and direct contestation,132 as well as by the larger conversation among the other
Justices in the four separate opinions.
To invoke Bakhtin, the existence of dissents such as Justice
Brennan’s in Michael H. makes more likely that the main
opinion’s authorial voice will engage with another’s rhetoric and
ideas, even when to do so addresses, exposes, and possibly even
reinforces “other . . . intentions.”133
IV. APPLICATION: VOICE AS INDEX OF DEEPER
STRUCTURES OF MEANING
Building on the framework for analyzing judicial opinion
voice developed in part III, this part uses variations in voice as an
entry point for a deeper analysis of judicial reasoning in three
cases. In these discussions, I point both to (1) shifts in authorial
voice, that is, variations in authors’ expressive approaches, as
suggested in Casey, and (2) departures from genre-based voice, for
example, where, as in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the plurality
departs from an opinion’s dispositional and justifying functions in
favor of argumentation, as openings to consider more closely these
opinions’ analytic coherence. Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that
variations in genre-based and authorial opinion voice are often
129. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 78.
130. Id.
131. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of how
these variant conceptions of tradition informed this dialogue, see AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
supra note 21, at 102–05.
132. John Leubsdorf has suggestively written of the “adversary character” of the “resulting multiplicities ” of writings in a divided opinion. Leubsdorf, supra note 28, at 491.
133. See BAKHTIN, supra n. 35, at 293–94; see also Rideout, supra note 12, at 87 nn. 77–
83 (discussing Bakhtin’s dialogism); supra note 12.
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connected, and difficult to disentangle, as suggested in discussing
the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore.
A. Casey
Here, the Article returns to Casey to trace the complex shifts
in reasoning that, I argue, are signaled by shifts in expression
and rhetorical framing. As noted, the deeply divided Casey
opinion comprised a main opinion and four separate writings concurring in part in the opinion or in the judgment and dissenting
in part. The result was a patchwork quilt of judicial writing
requiring a chart to keep track of the rationales stated in each
opinion and to confirm which portions of the main opinion
garnered five votes to constitute the ruling of the Court. But
quite apart from the complexity resulting from the variations in
views in the ensemble of opinions, the main opinion itself is noteworthy, and rhetorically complex, for having multiple Justices as
signing judicial authors.
The complexity of the main opinion in Casey (parts one, two,
and three), with its shifts in rhetoric and reasoning, seems as
much bound up in the multiplicity of authors and their concerns
and perspectives as in its subject matter. Part One begins with a
ringing sentence that encapsulates the aim of the opinion to shore
up the jurisprudential standing of Roe, which recognized a women’s liberty-based right under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy in its early stages:
“Liberty has no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”134 Following
that pronouncement is a short discussion of post-Roe history
indicating the degree to which the import of its holding had been
placed in doubt, then a statement “with clarity” of the three parts
of Roe’s “essential holding,” which the opinion reaffirmed:
women’s right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability;
the state’s power to limit abortions after viability; the state’s
interest from the beginning of pregnancy in protecting the health
of a pregnant woman and the life of the fetus.135
Part two of Casey reviews the liberty jurisprudence of which
Roe is a part and, despite its previous effort at clarity, the Court
here highlights the complexity of this body of law: “The
134. 531 U.S. at 844.
135. Id. at 846.
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inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process
claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to
exercise the same capacity which by tradition courts always have
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible
of expression as a simple rule.”136 As the opinion attempts to convey that decision making in this area can be challenging, even the
opinion’s syntax is confounding. (What boundaries are being
referred to? Reasoned judgment? The adjudication of substantive
due process claims?) This section goes on to address the moral
profundities of abortion, and the opinion’s voice takes on a
character that reflects a more philosophical cast of mind:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education. . . These matters
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under the compulsion of the state. 137

But the opinion no sooner takes this philosophic turn that it
hastens to assure the reader that its focus is rooted in practical
concerns: abortion is no mere “philosophic exercise. Abortion is a
unique act . . . fraught with consequences for others.”138 This
segment of the opinion suggests some familiarity or at least
empathy with the physical and emotional strains of pregnancy
but does so in a more detached voice that projects a generic
woman (“the woman”) and keeps the particular at a distance:
“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.”139
Part three of the opinion shifts to the doctrine of stare decisis,
and here, in the most jurisprudential portion of the opinion, it
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 849.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id.
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develops an extended analysis of that doctrine and its applications. It takes on an explanatory voice as it elaborates standards
(whether the decision has proved unworkable, whether it has induced reliance such that overruling would cause social harm,
whether it is doctrinally anachronistic, and whether its underlying factual premises have changed)140 by which to assess whether
a precedent merits overruling. It applies those standards to Roe
and concludes that the rule in Roe still justifies adherence.141
Then it illustrates how the overturning of two other lines of cases
(Lochner v. New York142 and Plessy v. Ferguson143) linked to
national controversies that the cases themselves became part of,
was consistent with these standards.144
Although the opinion remains largely faithful to the conventions of its genre, the joint drafting complicates its authorial
voice; the opinion shifts complexly from speaking with clarity to
voicing the complexity of liberty jurisprudence, from addressing
the moral implications of the decision to abort to focusing on the
practical and material, then back again to the philosophical,
before turning to the jurisprudential. This last section of the main
opinion that commands a majority concludes with a discussion of
the nature and source of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. Here,
the opinion refers to voice more directly:
The Court must take care to speak and act in a way that allows people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court
claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such,
no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged
to make.145

In the analysis of legitimacy, the joint opinion suggests that
judicial voice is concerned with the content of the opinion as much
as with its expression: even as it struggles to achieve clarity and
precision, the Court must speak in a way that assures its
audiences that its reasoning is based on legal principle. It is
perhaps in this concern, this effort to reframe voice to mean the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 854–55.
Id. at 855–61.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Roe, 531 U.S. at 861–64.
Id. at 865–66.
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Court’s speaking as an institution in a principled way, that the
joint opinion partly overcomes the unevenness in register
occasioned by differences in individual authorial voice, aspiration,
and emphasis.
B. Michael H. v. Gerald D.
This section looks again at the plurality in Michael H. v.
Gerald D. and connects the instability of that opinion’s due process rationale with a heightened emphasis conveyed in its
repeated resort to italicized statements. The highly fractured
Court that decided Michael H. was, as noted, deeply divided about
the proper approach to identifying whether a tradition existed for
recognizing a liberty interest in an unmarried biological father’s
pursuit of a paternal relationship with a married woman’s child
when a state law created a presumption that the mother’s husband was the child’s legitimate parent.146 Justice Brennan’s dissent highlighted most trenchantly a sharp difference in approach
with that of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion. Notably, in the insistence and assertiveness of the plurality’s vocal inflections, an
advocacy voice seemed to drown out the opinion voice. Here, the
departure from genre–based voice raised questions about the
assumptions that underlay the opinion’s reasoning.
Part three of the opinion determined that, in the face of a
state presumption of legitimacy, Michael H. had neither a
procedural right to establish at a hearing his paternity of a child
who was conceived and born while her mother was married and
living with her husband, nor a substantive due process right to
pursue a relationship with the child. Near the beginning of part
three, the plurality addressed the state courts’ denial of Michael
H.’s efforts to demonstrate paternity. The plurality’s description
of the basis for Michael H.’s application assumed that allowing
Michael H. to establish paternity would have a particular
consequence:
We address first the claims of Michael. At the outset, it is
necessary to clarify what he sought and what he was denied.
California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood. Michael was seeking to be declared the father of
146. See supra notes 123–133 and accompanying text.
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Victoria. The immediate benefit he evidently sought to
obtain from that status was visitation rights. But if Michael
were successful in being declared the father, other rights
would follow—most importantly, the right to be considered
as the parent who should have custody.147

Here, the plurality’s use of italics for emphasis voiced the
anxiety fueling the assumption that, if successful in establishing
paternity, Michael, an adulterous father, would seek custody of
Victoria and that a judicial declaration of paternity would accord
him exclusive parental rights vis-à-vis Gerald, the marital father.
In this view, the procedure of declaring Michael’s paternity was
inextricably linked to, and would result in, the marital father’s
loss of substantive paternal rights.
Later, after concluding that no specific tradition existed in
the law granting a biological father paternal rights over a child
born while her mother was married to another man, the plurality
confusingly seemed to disaggregate the very proceedings that it
had previously linked together. It asserted that even if the law
permitted one circumstanced as Michael to seek to overcome the
state’s presumption of legitimacy, it would be of no legal value
because the real claim in issue is not a declaration of paternity
but “substantive” parental rights. To make this point the opinion
emphasized the distinctness of the two claims:
Moreover, even if it were clear that one in Michael’s position
generally possesses, and has generally always possessed,
standing to challenge the marital child’s legitimacy, that
would still not establish Michael’s case. As noted earlier,
what is at issue here is not entitlement to a state
pronouncement that Victoria was begotten by Michael. It is
no conceivable denial of constitutional right for a State to
decline to declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges
upon the requested declaration.148

On first reading, the plurality’s shifting locutions appeared to
contradict its earlier assertion that seeking a declaration of
paternity is highly consequential. Instead, the plurality simply
147. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). For a discussion of the plurality’s rhetorical techniques in this passage, see AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
supra note 21, at 96–97.
148. Id. at 126.

2015

Understanding Voice

223

exaggerated the distinctness between the two proceedings to set
up what it considered to be the inevitable point of challenging the
presumption of legitimacy:
What Michael asserts here is a right to have himself declared the natural father and thereby to obtain parental prerogatives . . . . What he must establish, therefore, is not that
our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his
circumstances to establish paternity but that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least
has not traditionally denied them. Even if the law in all
States had always been that the entire world could challenge
the marital presumption and obtain a declaration as to who
was the natural father, that would not advance Michael’s
claim.149

Again, the plurality italicized what in its view was the only
reason to seek a declaration of paternity: to pursue parental
rights. In fact, the plurality had actually come full circle, taking
an oblique turn to trumpet its concerns that a marital father risks
losing all parental rights were a biological father to succeed in
establishing paternity:
Here, to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is
to deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa. If Michael has a “freedom not to conform” 150 (whatever that
means), Gerald must equivalently have a “freedom to conform.” One of them will pay a price for asserting that “freedom”—Michael by being unable to act as father of the child
he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by being unable to
preserve the integrity of the traditional family unit he and
Victoria have established.151

The plurality’s continued italicizing of its argument—the
visual sign of stridence in its decisional voice—underscored the
underlying instability of its interpretive approach. To sustain its
rationale, the plurality would need to demonstrate that the
paternal interests of Gerald and Michael could only be understood
149. Id. at 126–27 (quoted in part in AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 97) (emphasis in original).
150. Here the plurality refers to Justice Brennan’s dissent. Id. at 141.
151. Id. at 130 (quoted in AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 21, at 100) (emphasis in
original).
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as the California statute apparently considered them, in the
nature of a zero sum game, and could not otherwise be
accommodated in the law. Moreover, the plurality emphasized the
weightiness of the outcome by placing a weight on the scale:
characterizing Michael’s act as adulterous, whereas Gerald was
concerned with “preserv[ing] the integrity of the traditional
family unit,” assumed that the two men were not morally equivalent, and thus that an outcome awarding Michael paternal rights
would be against “nature,” in the sense that the state’s
presumption in favor of the marital father’s rights was part of the
natural order of things.
However, nothing in the case supported the conclusion that
Michael sought to displace Gerald as the head of household, or
that the recognition of Michael’s paternity would lead to his actually seeking custodial rights or guarantee any success in his seeking visitation with Victoria. As Justice Brennan’s dissent pointed
out, the reasoning at the core of the plurality opinion was flawed:
The plurality’s confusion about the proper analysis of claims
involving procedural due process also becomes obvious when
one examines the plurality’s shift in emphasis from the
putative father’s standing to his ability to obtain parental
prerogatives. In announcing that what matters is not the
father’s ability to claim paternity, but his ability to obtain
“substantive parental rights”, the plurality turns procedural
due process upside down. Michael’s challenge in this Court
does not depend on his ability ultimately to obtain visitation
rights; it would be strange indeed if, before one could be
granted a hearing, one were required to prove that one
would prevail on the merits. The point of procedural due
process is to give the litigant a fair chance at prevailing, not
to ensure a particular substantive outcome.152

What the plurality had strained to yoke together, the clarity
and directness of Justice Brennan’s dissenting voice exposed as
separable. The plurality’s reading of the facts, and assertions
about the consequences of granting Michael a paternity hearing,
amounted to argumentation rather than analysis. In a pointed
footnote, the plurality responds to Justice Brennan’s analysis,
observing that Michael’s petition “does not depend upon his
152. Id. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ability ultimately to obtain [substantive parental] rights, but it
surely depends upon his asserting a claim to those rights, which
is precisely what Justice BRENNAN denies.”153 But like a
trumpet’s blare, this rejoinder sounded with the hyper-confidence
of false bravado. Justice Brennan did not deny that Michael
would assert some right to pursue a parental relationship, but
sought to highlight that recognition of a procedural right
necessarily preceded any effort to pursue a substantive right. In
thus explaining the “point of procedural due process,” the credible
voice of Justice Brennan’s dissent is matter-of-fact, cogent, and
comparatively muted, in contrast to the sense of urgency that we
hear in the plurality opinion.
The plurality elided the distinction between procedural and
substantive due process while assuming an either-or categorization of potential paternal interests. Drawing on insistent
repetitions and assertions, the plurality diverged from the genrebased functions of an opinion. Instead, its characterizations and
categorizations
assumed
functions
that
more
closely
approximated advocacy. The plurality’s departure from genrebased voice, that is, the way in which the plurality sounds, and
functions, like an argument, helps draw our aural attention to its
resort to unwarranted assumptions and instances of strained
reasoning.
C. Bush v. Gore
This section addresses the discordance of the per curiam
opinion of Bush v. Gore,154 an opinion putatively written as an
expression of institutional voice, to demonstrate the ruptures in
reasoning at its core. If a jointly authored opinion as in Casey
presents challenges to rhetorical coherence and consistency in
authorial voice, one might think that the per curiam opinion,
which ostensibly represents the institutional voice, would conquer
the shifts and variations in voice that are seemingly attributable
to multiple authors. Yet the implications for authorial voice are
once again complex if the Court’s resort to the mechanism of the
per curiam actually reflects the absence of consensus in judicial

153. Id. at 126 n.5 (emphasis in original).
154. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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rationale,155 as it did in Bush v. Gore.156 There, the Court held that
the divergent ballot counting standards applied in various Florida
counties during the 2000 Presidential election presented an equal
protection issue. Another example of a divided Court, Bush v.
Gore actually consisted of six opinions: in addition to the per curiam, the ruling included a concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, and dissents authored by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.157 Quite apart
from the differences among these separate opinions, the discordance within the main per curiam opinion is itself striking. Tracing
the opinion’s fluctuations in genre-based and authorial voice
helps to illuminate its self-contradictory turns.
First, the Court claimed a novel equal protection basis for
reversing the Florida Supreme Court, rooted in the “manner” by
which the right to vote is exercised:
The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the
minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters
necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida’s basic
command for the count of legally cast votes is to consider the
“intent of the voter.” (citations omitted.)This is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The
problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to
ensure its equal application. The formulation of uniform
rules to determine intent based on these recurring
circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, necessary. . . .
The want of those rules here has led to unequal evaluation
of ballots in various respects. . . . As seems to have been
acknowledged at oral argument, the standards for accepting
or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from

155. Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme
Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 524–30 (2000) [hereinafter
The Road to Bush v. Gore]. This section draws on Ray’s analysis of Bush v. Gore as a per
curiam opinion to illustrate how the opinion’s strained reasoning finds expression in the
opinion’s voice and especially in its departure from genre-based voice. In considering the
plurality’s use of the per curiam opinion form in Bush v. Gore, Ray suggests a number of
motivating factors, including the exigencies surrounding the issuance of the opinion, an
effort to create an “aura of consensus,” and the Court’s concern to limit the case to its
unique context. Id. at 571–74.
156. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
157. This configuration of separate opinion authors identified the per curiam’s authors
as Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.
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county to county but indeed within a single county from one
recount team to another.158

Then the Court announced in a voice that combined overconfidence and a certain disingenuousness that seven members of
the Court concurred with its unprecedented constitutional
analysis: “Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are
constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court that demand a remedy [citing to Justice Souter’s
and Justice Breyer’s dissents]. The only disagreement is as to the
remedy.”159
But, as commentator Laura Krugman Ray persuasively
points out, for all the per curiam’s attempts to highlight that
seven Justices identified an equal protection issue, only a bare
majority of five agreed with the result of the per curiam’s equal
protection rationale.160 Justices Souter and Breyer in dissent,
while recognizing an equal protection issue, rejected the main
opinion’s remedy to reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s order of
a recount and in effect award the election to then Governor Bush.
Rather, these dissenting Justices would have remanded the case
to allow the recounting procedure to continue.161 And because
even Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion added its own
highly specific ground—that the Florida Supreme Court’s reading
of Florida law violated the requirements of federal law for
designating how Presidential electors will be selected162—it seems
clear that the concurring members of the Court actually found the
equal protection rationale for the main opinion to be too narrow to
stand on its own.163
Moreover, the per curiam opinion itself seemed to
acknowledge the doctrinal anomaly it had introduced by almost
immediately reversing course; after announcing the equal
protection rationale for overturning the Florida Supreme Court, it
disclaimed an intent to continue that line of equal protection
analysis by limiting the holding to the particular circumstances.
Here the Court wrote in a voice that exuded confidence in its legal
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

531 U.S. at 105–06 (per curiam).
Id. at 111 (per curiam).
RAY, The Road to Bush v. Gore, supra note 155, at 572–73.
Id.
Id. at 572 (discussing Bush, 531 U.S. at 121–22 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
Id.
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analysis and then, without abandoning the confident tone,
seemed to sidestep the import of announcing a new application of
the equal protection doctrine by offering a self-limited holding:
The recount process, in its features here described, is
inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to
protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special
instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a
single state judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.164

The absence, for example, of a transitional expression such as
“however” to acknowledge for the reader this anomaly (“our consideration is limited . . .”) hurried the reader along and seemed an
effort to deflect attention from, rather than engage with, the implications of its holding.
The Court did not refer to the particularities of these ballot
counting procedures as the reason for limiting the scope of its
ruling but rather to the “complexities” of the equal protection
issue in the election context. Yet reliance on the complexities of
equal protection law as applied to the election context to limit the
ruling seems perplexing, given the Court’s history of involvement
in precisely that issue, a history that the per curiam documented
to set up its equal protection rationale.165 The shift midparagraph in authorial framing and emphasis from confident assertion of the equal protection ground of decision to “self-effacing”
limitation166 in abandoning that ground as a basis for further doctrinal development, alerts us to an unresolved rupture in the
Court’s underlying reasoning.167 And in its show of reticence to
continue the line of equal protection analysis beyond the “present
circumstances,” the per curiam seemed to depart from the
164. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam) (quoted in part in RAY, The Road to Bush v.
Gore, supra note 155, at 574).
165. Id. at 104–05, 107 (per curiam) (discussing equal protection precedent in voting
context).
166. Cf. RAY, The Road to Bush v. Gore, supra note 155, at 521 (referring to the per
curiam more generally as “the most self-effacing judicial form”).
167. Ray suggests that the use of the per curiam form is convenient for portraying the
opinion as one of “modest intentions,” one that eschews an aim of opening up new constitutional ground for further development. Id. at 575.
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authoritative and justifying voice that we associate with the
functions, and hence the genre, of the judicial opinion.
The internal contradictions continued in the per curiam’s
insistence that the Court acted with awareness of the limits on its
role when in fact it adopted a remedy that impaired voters’ efforts
to exercise the franchise. Here, the Court wrote with a voice that
sounded a concern for proving its bona fides:
None are more conscious of the limits on judicial authority
than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more in
admiration of the Constitution’s design to leave the selection
of the President to the people, through their legislatures,
and to the political sphere.168

Given that, in actuality, the Court followed a path not of
restraint, but rather of considerable overreach into a state’s
administration of its election procedures, its protestations of
unwilling involvement in the case rang hollowly:
When contending parties invoke the process of the courts,
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has
been forced to confront.169

As dissenting Justice Breyer observed in a measured judicial
voice grounded in enduring institutional concerns, the Court,
while espousing the rhetoric of restraint, failed to “adequately
attend[ ] to that ‘necessary check upon our own exercise of power,’
‘our own sense of self-restraint.’”170
The per curiam’s fastidiousness in expressing its due respect
for the separation of powers offers another revealing glimpse of
how voice and reasoning are mutually implicated. Here, the
authorial anxiety betrayed in the opinion’s repeated assurances
that the Court had not overstepped its role suggested the opposite: its strained vocalizations signaled the strains in the per
curiam’s reasoning and the lack of internal consistency and
coherence that a more solidly grounded opinion would have
168. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (quoted in part in RAY, The Road to Bush v. Gore, supra
note 155, at 574).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 158 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (quoting THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 185
(1962)).
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provided. At the same time, the sense of judicial unease does not
square with an opinion’s genre-based voice of authoritative
justification.
Using voice in this way as an aid to interpreting Casey,
Michael H., and Bush v. Gore bears some resemblance to a
variation of voice that Peter Elbow refers to as “resonant voice,”
which he has described as “often correlat[ing] with places where a
text has a hole or crack or disjuncture.”171 Elbow considers that
resonant voice has the “self’s resources behind or underneath
it”172 and thus suggests that it can be more revealing of the
author, if less than a self-portrait.173 Complicating Elbow’s conception is the particular way in which judicial opinion voice subsumes genres and multiple authorial contributions. Thus, it
would be challenging to identify the “self” whose resources are
revealed. Yet Elbow’s formulation gets at something important
about attentiveness to voice: shifts in modulation of judicial
opinion voice can illuminate ruptures in reasoning and coherence
that are critical to discern—that can be heard—in the work of
judicial interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article offers a framework for understanding judicial
opinion voice as an interpretive resource to enable deep readings
of judicial opinions. It first addresses the complexity of voice as a
concept and, drawing on the work of literary theory and its
application to legal writing, it posits that judicial opinion voice
has two aspects. Genre-based voice is rooted in the function, context, and audience of judicially oriented writing and the other,
authorial voice, is linked to the identity and distinctive rhetorical
choices of judicial authors. Neither of these aspects is unitary.
Genre-based judicial opinion voice subsumes within it functions of
bench memos and advocacy briefs reflecting the ways in which
these writings exist in relation to opinions. Similarly, authorial
judicial voice is never singular but typically reflects multiple
authorial contributions and perspectives.

171. Elbow, supra note 7, at 13.
172. Id. at 14.
173. Id.
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Although these aspects of judicial opinion voice are
conceptually related and at times overlapping, the Article has
treated them as analytically distinct to convey the nuanced and
multi-faceted way in which voice operates. Having developed this
more complex formulation of voice, this Article has suggested that
attention to judicial voice in its multiplicity can serve as an entry
point for a deeper analysis of judicial rhetoric, one which helps to
explain the trajectory of a court’s reasoning and doctrinal
perspective. Using voice as interpretive method can lead us to
intervals in judicial writing where crucial, if often
unacknowledged, analytic shifts or glosses may occur and
illuminates tensions and discordance in jurisprudential approach.
Applying the framework developed here for analyzing judicial
opinion voice offers another resource for the difficult work of
interpretation, and the search for evidence of principled decision
making, or its absence, that all close readers of opinions strive to
achieve.

